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From Nicholas Maxwell, From Knowledge to Wisdom (Blackwell, 1984), pp. 269-275

[In order to improve our knowledge and understanding of human and other life on earth, embedded in the physical universe, we need to pursue] a mode of inquiry that I call the generalized Darwinian research programme.
All life is the embodiment of purposiveness. (Plants achieve their goals primarily by growth.) From the present standpoint, Darwin's great achievement was to provide an explanation as to how the vast diversity of forms of embodied purposiveness we find on earth can have come to be even though we live in a physicalistic universe. Darwin postulated two mechanisms: (a) random inherit​able variation; (b) natural selection. We conjecture that billions of years ago, molecules developed that acquired the capacity to reproduce: possibly these consisted of crystalline rods which grew in length until they broke as a result of environmental buffeting. Those inheritable variations with the greatest capacity to grow and reproduce multiplied, while other variations died out: this process continued, leading in the course of time to the world as we find it today, including ourselves. Amongst the predictions of the theory are the following. (i) In its given environment, an animal pursues a pattern of goals, a way of life, organized so as to promote the overall goal of reproductive success. (ii) Its body is designed so as to facilitate the pursuit of these goals. (iii) In the past, the pattern of goals, and the body changed very gradually, possibly in step with a changing environment, in such a way that each small change enhanced reproductive success.
Two interpretations of Darwin's theory – or of neo-Darwinism – need to be distinguished. They may be called the anti-purposive and the purposive interpretations.
Anti-purposivism interprets neo-Darwinism in such a way that the theory helps us to eliminate purposiveness from Nature, the aim being to explain and understand the biological world in non-purposive terms, in terms of molecular biology, and ultimately in terms of the purposeless laws of chemistry and physics. The aim is to explain and understand ostensible purposiveness in the world by explaining it away, ultimately everything being explicable solely in physicalistic terms.
Purposivism, in contrast, interprets neo-Darwinism in such a way that the theory enables us to explain and understand how and why purposiveness has evolved in Nature, in a way that is in accordance with physicalism. The task of purposive neo-Darwin​ism is to enable us to explain and understand how the diverse purposive patterns exhibited by, and embodied in, plant and animal life, have gradually come to be superimposed upon the fixed pattern of physicalistic law. Purposivism accepts physicalism but is anti-reductionist.
Insofar as we understand ourselves as purposive beings (at the very least) anti-purposivism creates an entirely artificial (and thoroughly non-Darwinian) hiatus between the purposeless bio​logical world of Nature, and the purposeful human world of history and the present.​[1]​ This hiatus is automatically avoided by purposivism, the interpretation adopted here.
The generalized Darwinian research programme accepts physi​calism, and seeks to understand how and why all purposiveness has evolved in the universe – especially purposiveness associated with what we value most in human life, such as sentience, consciousness, person-to-person understanding, science, art, free​dom, love. This programme of research brings together, into a coherent field of inquiry, aspects of such diverse fields of research as orthodox Darwinian theory (given its purposive interpretation), the study of animal behaviour, palaeontology, archaeology, history, anthropology, psycho-neurology, artificial intelligence, psychology, sociology, philosophy, linguistics, semantics, history and philosophy of science, and history and philosophy of inquiry more generally (the history and philosophy of ideas and culture). Person-to-person understanding of people in the past is embedded in a more general animal-to-animal understanding (so brilliantly displayed by Jane Goodall, for example, in her almost 'anthropo​logical' studies of chimpanzees). Animal-to-animal understanding involves not only endeavouring imaginatively to enter into the lives and experiences of animals: it also involves interpreting ourselves as animals – as close cousins of chimpanzees, for example. Animal-to-animal understanding is in turn embedded in the more general purposive understanding, this in turn being embedded in physicalistic understanding (which, however, is itself an evolution of person-to-person understanding).
In line with physicalism, this programme of research presupposes that goal-pursuing entities do not come abruptly into existence from prior purposeless states of affairs. There is no sponataneous generation of life. Furthermore, there is no abrupt initiation of new goal-directed activity, radically different from antecedent goal-directed activity, to such an extent that the new goal-directed activity is as inexplicable as spontaneous generation of life. All new goal-directed activity (it is presumed) can be explained and understood as arising as a slight, intelligible modification of prior goal-directed activity. Where radically new goal-directed activity does genuinely arise, this is due to an already existing capacity for innovation, creativity, originality or learning, gradually and intelligibly developed in the past and suddenly given the oppor​tunity to flourish in a new way by a small, intelligible change of circumstances. Of course, there are a multitude of goal-directed activities going on in the world, associated especially with human life, that seem radically different from previous activities. It is these innovative activities that pose the problems that the generalized Darwinian programme seeks to solve.
One important general problem confronting this programme is the problem of how purposive beings create new purposive beings. Four possibilities are (a) exclusively genetic or biological repro​duction; (b) genetic plus educational or cultural reproduction; (c) manufacture; (d) manufacture plus education ((c) and (d) arising in connection with robots).
A momentous development in evolution is the transition from (a) to (b). It is this which makes cultural evolution possible – the evolution of new ways of life even in the absence of genetic evolution. New kinds of actions, initiated by individual animals, are learned by offspring, culturally inherited as it were, and progressively developed during the course of a number of generations. Social and cultural changes that have taken place throughout human history, and more recent scientific, techno​logical and associated social and cultural changes – unprecedented in their radical character and ever accelerating rapidity of occurrence when put into the context of biological evolution as a whole – both exemplify, and depend upon the prior existence of, cultural evolution. Much that is essential to our humanity, to our identity as the individual persons we now are, such as language, personal relationships, customs, institutions, values, exist and persist because of a long prior process of cultural evolution.
How does cultural reproduction and evolution itself gradually evolve from almost exclusively genetic reproduction and evolution? In order for it to be possible for animals to reproduce and evolve culturally it is essential for animals to possess two capacities: (i) the capacity to learn individually, and (ii) the capacity to imitate (itself, perhaps, a special kind of learning). It seems likely that the development of cultural reproduction is, in addition, associated with the development of parental care. For it is primarily when offspring are cared for by parents for some time that learning through imitating others is likely to have survival value. We may postulate, then, the gradual development of (i) the capacity to learn, (ii) the capacity to care for young, and (iii) the capacity to imitate, by means of almost exclusively genetic evolution. Parental care, for example, begins with care being taken to place eggs advantageously: this leads to guarding eggs; to moving and guarding newly-hatched offspring (performed by crocodiles), to feeding offspring (birds). When to what crocodiles and birds do there is added training in how to find food, hunt, or escape from predators – performed by many mammals – the conditions for cultural reproduction to occur are satisfied. In such conditions, mutations promoting the capacity to imitate and to learn from parental actions in youth will have survival value. Such mutations make cultural reproduction and evolution possible.
Whether a way of life is reproduced in an exclusively genetic way, or in a way that is in part genetic, in part cultural, is something that can in principle be determined empirically. Spiders spin webs and execute other aspects of a spider way of life entirely successfully even if reared in isolation from other spiders: here the way of life is passed on from body to body in an exclusively genetic way (in the given environment). In the case of many mammals, however, and especially the primates, this is not the case at all. Even if given the opportunity to survive and to learn how to survive in an isolated but otherwise carefully controlled environ​ment, many mammals will, in these circumstances fail to develop the capacity to survive and reproduce if returned to their natural habitat. Young chimpanzees die simply from being deprived of the presence of their mothers.
The development of (b) genetic-plus-cultural-reproduction (from prior (a) exclusively-genetic-reproduction) changes pro​foundly the character of evolution. In particular, it makes it possible for non-genetic, exclusively cultural changes in an animal's way of life to be an essential part of the cause of subsequent morphological changes of descendants, changes that are genetically reproduced, as Hardy (1965) especially has emphasized.
The great advantage of the generalized Darwinian research programme, just outlined, is that it provides a framework for understanding the deeds, achievements and experiences of people in a way that is compatible with the kind of knowledge and understanding achieved in the physical sciences, without being reducible to such knowledge and understanding. It promises to enable us to understand ourselves as a part of the biological domain without our humanity, our distinctive human value, being in any way denied: persons are not reduced to animals, and nor are animals misconceived to be persons. It holds out the hope that we can come to understand the human world as an integral part of the natural world without the meaning and value of the human world being thereby conceptually annihilated. The programme specifies in general terms what we must seek to do in order to develop a coherent understanding of nature and of ourselves which does justice to the character of both.
From the standpoint of the philosophy of wisdom, of course, this programme of research provides no more than a background to the central task of rational inquiry: to help us develop our overall goal of seeking reproductive success, inherited from our evolutionary past, so that it becomes the goal of living life lovingly, cooperatively helping to develop a less suffering, more loving human world.

My claim is that the above discussion shows how physicalism and experiential realism can be reconciled, in an intellectually fruitful way. But how, it may be asked, can free will be reconciled with physicalism?
A major part of the problem here is to arrive at an acceptable definition of 'free will'. I suggest that an acceptable definition must be such that it is clear that 'free will', in the defined sense, is something that is of great value to possess, the more valuable the better the definition.
An important part of what we ought to mean by free will, or freedom, can, I suggest, be put like this: to be free is to have the capacity (and the opportunity) to realize what is of value in life. We are free to the extent that we do, or do not, possess this capacity (and opportunity). Clearly, it is of great value to have 'free will' in this sense.
Granted that this conception of free will is accepted, then the above discussion, in showing how it is possible for there to be purposive human life of value immersed in a physicalistic universe, also shows how it is possible for there to be some degree of freedom associated with human life even though physicalism is true.
It deserves to be noted that freedom, in this sense, satisfies the Darwinian requirement of being something that can be understood to have developed gradually, in small steps, during the course of evolution. It develops gradually with the gradual development of the capacity to learn, to imitate, to dream and to imagine, to be sentient and conscious, and to be able to communicate (all of which exists in chimpanzees, for example).
How free are we? From the standpoint of this book, our freedom is to be judged in terms of our capacity and opportunity to avoid suffering and death and live life lovingly. Clearly, when judged from this perspective, human freedom is severely restricted.
In order to increase our freedom, in this sense, we need, quite generally, to improve our aims and methods as we live in such a way that we realize what is of value to us. Rational inquiry, pursued in accordance with the philosophy of wisdom, has as its basic task, to increase freedom!
An argument in support of the contention that mankind does indeed have the capacity to be free emerges from just that which seems to threaten the possibility of freedom – namely the success of theoretical physics (or natural philosophy). The argument can be put like this. Suppose physicalism is true. Suppose, that is, that the universe really is comprehensible in the kind of way modern physics holds it to be. In this case one cooperative human endeavour of great value has been extraordinarily successful, namely the endeavour of improving our knowledge and under​standing of the universe. Here then is a practical demonstration of human freedom (as defined above). If physicalism is true, in short, mankind definitely does have the capacity to be free. The truth of physicalism, far from threatening, actually serves to establish, the reality of human freedom.

The argument of this chapter might be summarized as follows. 
Two important lessons are to be learned from the success of physical science: a view of the world, and a methodology. The view of the world is physicalism, qualified by experiential realism. The methodology is aim-oriented empiricism generalized to become aim-oriented rationalism. The generalized Darwinian research programme holds out the hope of enabling us to improve our understanding of how cooperative aim-oriented rationalistic life of value might come to be in the physical universe. At the same time it emphasizes the fundamental importance of endeavouring to put cooperative aim-oriented rationalism into practice in our lives, within the framework indicated, so that we may come to develop a less cruel, more loving world.
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^1	  Monod and Dawkins both incline towards adoption of the anti-purposive interpretation of Darwinian theory: as a result, both hold that evolution of a new kind comes into existence with the cultural evolution of humanity. See Monod (1974, chs. 8 and 9); Dawkins (1978, ch. 11).
